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Abstract 
The twenty-first century has ushered in demand by some 
Americans for annoyancetech devices—novel electronic gadgets that 
secretly fend off, punish, or comment upon perceived antisocial and 
annoying behaviors of others.  Manufacturers, marketers, and users 
of certain annoyancetech devices, however, face potential tort 
liability for personal and property damages suffered by the targets 
of this “revenge by gadget.”  Federal, state, and local policymakers 
should start the process of coming to pragmatic terms with the 
troubling rise in the popularity of annoyancetech devices.  This is an 
 
*  Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.  My thanks go to my research 
assistants Bill Frederick and Ian Koven for excellent and helpful work.   
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area of social policy that cries out for thoughtful and creative 
legislative solutions. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: FASCINATING NEW AND TROUBLING VIGILANTE 
TECHNOLOGIES  
Technology is a two-edged sword: new machines, devices, 
processes, contrivances, appliances, tools, and gizmos can bring 
benefits; but there are negative consequences to boot.1  Indeed, at 
one time the federal government funded an Office of Technology 
Assessment (“OTA”) (now defunct) that studied new and emerging 
technologies and issued reports on how to manage and regulate 
these cutting edge tools.2 
It is fundamental, of course, that at least since the early years of 
the twentieth century, tort law has imposed liability on 
manufacturers, sellers, and users of products (whether new or old).  
Under theories of warranty, intentional torts, negligence, and strict 
liability (of one sort or the other), tort law has awarded damages to 
victims of technology gone awry or misused.3  
A beguiling recent development, however, raises interesting legal 
 
1 See generally EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE 
OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996) (discussing several types of mechanical, chemical, 
biological, and medical technological innovations with negative unintended consequences); see 
also JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 265–71 (1989) (discussing the paradoxes and 
unanticipated impacts of human attempts to control the environment); Robert F. Blomquist, 
Legal Perspectives on Cloning: Cloning Endangered Animal Species?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 
410–16 (1998) (discussing the pros and cons of an aggressive policy of government cloning of 
endangered animal species).  
2 The Office of Technology Assessment was created in 1972 as an analytical arm of 
Congress.  Wikipedia.org, Office of Technology Assessment, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Technology_Assessment (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).  
The basic purpose of the OTA was to help members of Congress better anticipate and plan for 
the consequences of technological change and to examine the intended and unintended ways 
that the new technologies affect people’s lives.  Id.  The OTA was eliminated by Congress in 
1995.  Id.  At its most active period during the 1980s, OTA had “studies under way in nine 
program areas: energy and materials; industry, technology, and employment; international 
security and commerce; biological applications; food and renewable resources; health; 
communication, and information technologies; oceans and environment; and science, 
education, and transportation.”  U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
EFFICIENCY PUB. NO. OTA-INTE-317 (back inside cover) (1986) (on file with author).   
3 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963) (recognizing 
an injured man’s claim for strict product liability predicated on a manufacturing defect that 
caused him personal injuries when he was using a power tool that his wife had purchased for 
him; the court concluded that the plaintiff should not be forced to seek recovery against the 
manufacturer under the less attractive law of warranties); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
111 N.E. 1050, 1051–53 (N.Y. 1916) (holding, in an opinion authored by Judge Cardozo, that 
the plaintiff automobile driver could sue the manufacturer for negligence even though there 
was no privity of contract between the parties). 
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questions.  In an August 2007 Wall Street Journal article, 
innocuously placed in the “Weekend Journal” section, readers 
learned of “the growing ranks of electronic vigilantes” who have 
started to deploy novel gadgetry to secretly fend off, punish, or 
comment upon annoying behavior of their fellow Americans.4  
“Thanks to the falling cost of microcontroller chips and the lure of 
easy online sales, inventors are turning out record numbers of 
gadgets.  One growing subset of these inventions: products that help 
people neutralize antisocial behavior at the push of a button.”5  
Who are the purveyors of these new anti-antisocial behavior 
contraptions?  “The brains behind these devices range from 
entrepreneurs in suburban Los Angeles to graduate students at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.”6  Some examples are 
illuminating: (1) “A Tennessee company has created a $50 device 
that shuts up other people’s dogs by answering their barks with an 
ultrasonic squeal that humans can’t hear,” and is deceptively 
inserted in a backyard birdhouse;7 (2) “British inventors are 
exporting a new product for people who hate lousy drivers—it’s a 
luminescent screen that fits in a car’s rear window and, at the 
driver’s command, flashes one of five messages to other motorists” 
including “Back Off,” “Idiot,” “a sad face,” a happy face and—not yet 
widely disseminated, but demanded by some purchasers of the 
screen—“offensive hand gestures”;8 (3) MIT’s Media Lab, which has 
coined the new word “annoyancetech” has developed a “‘No-Contact 
Jacket’ that, when activated with a controller, delivers a blast of 
electricity to anyone who touches the person wearing it”;9 (4) the 
“Annoy-a-tron,” designed for simple revenge by allowing a user to 
hide the device under the desks of one’s enemies with the device 
 
4 Jennifer Saranow, Revenge by Gadget, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2007, at W1. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 Id.  The product, known as the “Outdoor Bark Control Birdhouse” was developed “by 
accident.”  Indeed:  
Though the technology has been around for five years, the manufacturer, Radio Systems 
of Knoxville, Tenn., initially sold it as an indoor training tool for pet owners.  But the 
company says it began getting requests from customers for an outdoor version that could 
be used on annoying neighborhood dogs.  When a market analysis showed 60% of 
consumers would welcome a covert way to shut up somebody else’s canine, the company 
decided to proceed. . . . After flirting with fake rocks and footballs [to camouflage the 
device], the company settled on a somewhat unlikely design—a brightly painted 
Bavarian-style birdhouse. 
Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  “During a demonstration in Japan . . . [the device] drew interest from women who 
were eager to retaliate against gropers on the subway.”  Id.  
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emitting “a loud, piercing little beep”;10 (5) a specially revamped 
iPod which silences annoying FM radio stations in taxicabs;11 (6) 
“TV-B-Gone,” “a $20 handset that allows people to shut off loud 
televisions in public places like doctor’s offices and bars”;12 (7) 
“cellphone [sic] jammers”;13 (8) “the Mosquito,”—marketed by a firm 
called “Kids Be Gone”—which “emits high-frequency sounds 
particularly irritating to congregations of teenagers”;14 and (9) an 
invention called the “‘I-Bomb’ that emits an electromagnetic pulse 
that disables all electronics in its range (a similar device was 
depicted in the movie ‘Ocean’s Eleven’)”15 and that, for instance, 
could be used to shut down a neighbor playing loud music on her 
stereo.   
Yet—apparently unexamined at this writing—the manufacturers, 
marketers, and users of certain annoyancetech devices face possible 
liability for various tort causes of action by those who are the 
 
10 Revenge in the Form of the Annoy-a-tron, http://www.coolest-
gadgets.com/20070130/revenge-in-the-form-of-the-annoy-a-tron/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).  
According to this Web site:   
Some people are just annoying and deserve to be messed with for whatever 
reason. . . . The Annoy-a-tron serves a simple purpose: to annoy someone or even a whole 
group of people.  It’s extremely small [a little larger than a quarter] . . . and even has a 
built in magnet to help you hide it.  Once in place, you can set your Annoy-a-tron to emit 
a 2 kHz, 12 kHz (this is the more cruel setting), or an alternating sound every few 
minutes. . . . Intervals range from 2 to 8 minutes; your target will never know when the 
next beep will come!  Slowly but surely, you’ll defeat your enemy, or maybe the battery 
will just run out, but that’ll be a good 3–4 weeks. 
Id. 
11 Saranow, supra note 4, at W1.  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id. 
15 Id.; see also Mary Hanna, Fighting Fire with Fire, DAILY REV. (Hayward, Cal.), Aug. 22, 
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 16385507 (“Gone are the days when we simply ask someone to 
turn down the volume [of music or a TV or dog] and he complies with an apology.  We seem to 
find fighting excessive noise with gadgets to be safer then [sic] confronting people, what with 
the prevalence of Intermittent Explosive Disorder, which used to be called having a short 
fuse.  What if you ask your neighbor to quiet his dog and he goes all postal on you?  Next 
thing you know he’ll be training the pooch to jump the fence and attack you.”); Robot 
Vigilante Homemade ‘Bum Bot’ Patrols Area near Atlanta Bar at Night, AUGUSTA CHRON. 
(Ga.), Apr. 23, 2008, at B7 (describing an invention of a bar owner that patrols an Atlanta 
neighborhood and is controlled by the bar owner with a wireless remote control, the “Bum 
Bot” is equipped with bright red lights, a blazing spotlight, an infrared video camera, and a 
water cannon on the spinning turret on top, warning vagrants through a loudspeaker that 
they are trespassing); Arthur H. Rotstein, Groups Use Camera to Keep Watchful Eye on 
Border, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR (Cal.), Apr. 19, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 7366001 
(describing border vigilante groups that watch the U.S. southern border with Mexico and 
make video recordings of suspects); Paige Wiser, Annoyance Is Mother of Today’s Inventions, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at 17 (“The hottest area for inventors is known as 
‘annoyancetech’—stealth gadgets for cranky people.  Now, they like to be called ‘electronic 
vigilantes.’”).  
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intended or foreseeable targets of these evolving electronic vigilante 
technologies.  My overarching purpose in the remainder of this very 
brief overview article is to sketch possible tort causes of action by 
plaintiffs harmed by annoyancetech devices and potential defenses 
to these annoyancetech torts.  First, in Part II, various 
annoyancetech tort causes of action are discussed.16  Then, in Part 
III, potential assorted annoyancetech tort defenses are analyzed.17  
Finally, in Part IV, public policy implications of annoyancetech 
manufacturing, marketing, and use are considered.18   
II.  ANNOYANCETECH TORT CAUSES OF ACTION 
We live in a world full of annoying behaviors.  No doubt, from 
 
16 See infra notes 19–39 and accompanying text.  
17 See infra notes 40–74 and accompanying text.  
18 See infra notes 75–102 and accompanying text.  This article will bypass a discrete and 
growing area of electronic vigilantism—cyber-vigilantism involving computers.  There are 
swelling reports of this emerging social trend.  See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Campaign ‘08: Gay-
Marriage Backers Allege Web Mischief in California, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at A8 
(“Opponents of California’s proposed ban on gay marriage claim their Web site was shut down 
by a coordinated computer attack, amid rising tensions over one of the nation’s most 
controversial ballot measures” involving an electronic vigilante “‘denial of service’ attack”); 
China’s Online Vigilantes: Virtual Carnivores, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2008, at 47 (describing 
“[h]uman-flesh searching” in China, also known as “crowdsourcing” in English-speaking 
countries, that involves posting personal information of those perceived to have done or said 
something wrong by “internet vigilantes”); B.J. Lee, Death by Web Posts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 
2008, at 51 (reporting that an unsubstantiated rumor about a South Korean actress and 
singer, spread “among hundreds of thousands of chat-room users,” led the woman to hang 
herself from the stress); Sue Shellenbarger, Cyberbully Alert: Web Sites Make It Easier to 
Flag Trouble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at D1 (describing how social networking sites have 
made it easier to report cyber-vigilantism involving computers).  Legal scholars have 
addressed cyber-vigilantism in recent articles.  See, e.g., Michael A. Fisher, The Right to 
Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 399–400 (2000) 
(discussing anti-spamming vigilante revenge on the internet in reaction to cyber spamming); 
Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1377 (2008) (describing, among 
other phenomena, web-surfing vigilantes who seek embarrassing information about neighbors 
they want to chase out of town); Monica R. Shah, The Case for a Statutory Suppression 
Remedy to Regulate Illegal Private Party Searches in Cyberspace, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 
250–51 (2005) (describing vigilante computer hackers who gain access to an individual’s 
private information and use or disseminate this information); Richard Warner, Spam and 
Beyond: Freedom, Efficiency, and the Regulation of E-mail Advertising, 22 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141, 142 (2003) (discussing “lewd and annoying electronic messages 
that can flood [computer] user mailboxes and cripple networks” and cause “a wicked 
backlash” including “vigilante action”).  Moreover, this article will also bypass a newly-
emerging technological vigilante trend—and accompanying potential tort liability—involving 
the manufacturing, marketing, and use of products by motorists to block government cameras 
that capture the license plate numbers of traffic offenders like photo-blocking clear-plastic 
print and Web sites, like Trapster.com, that allow the motorist to see and update a 
computerized map of government roadway cameras.  See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Get the 
Feeling You’re Being Watched? If You’re Driving, You Just Might Be, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 
2009, at A1 (discussing traffic cameras and motorist vigilante technology).  
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time to time, every human being annoys others.  For the most part, 
tort law seeks to bypass trifles, bad manners, bothersome and pesky 
human behavior—at least if the behavior is unintentional, sporadic, 
and minor.  But discerning what is a mere trifle, on the one hand, 
and what is tortious harm, on the other hand, can sometimes be 
difficult. 
The term “tort”—derived from Latin roots meaning “twisted”—
suggests that “tortious conduct is twisted conduct, conduct that 
departs from [social] norm[s].”19  So, broadly speaking, “torts are 
traditionally associated with wrongdoing in some moral sense.”20  
Indeed, tort theorists have engaged in a dynamic, ongoing debate 
over the past half-century between those who espouse economic 
efficiency grounds of tort liability, on the one hand,21 and others 
who have argued “that the foundations of tort law rest[] more firmly 
on moral ground.”22  As Professor Dan Dobbs cogently notes, “[i]n 
the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the 
conclusion that the wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable 
way.”23 
Legal fault, in the law of torts, is traditionally grouped into two 
categories: (1) intentional wrongs and (2) negligent wrongs.24  “Most 
commonly, the intentional tort defendant is consciously aware of his 
wrongdoing [and] he is always aware of his act.”25  Negligent wrongs 
entail unreasonably risky behaviors that actually result in harm.  
 
19 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (2001). 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 3–4 (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW 1 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–68 (7th ed. 
2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1–4 (1987); Guido Calabresi, 
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01 (1961); 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabilty: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (1972); R. H. Coase, The Problem 
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18–19 (1960); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851–52 (1981); C. Robert Morris, 
Jr., Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process—The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE 
L.J. 554, 555 (1961); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 
(1972).   
22 David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 2 (David G. 
Owen ed., 1995); see also, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 276–312 (1986); CHARLES FRIED, 
AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 2 (1970); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 2–3 (1995); 
Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 259–60 
(1976); Jules L. Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473, 474 
(1974); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37, 37 
(1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 268–74 (1980). 
23 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 2 (emphasis added).  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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“The defendant in the negligence case is sometimes aware that he is 
taking unreasonable risks; he is always in violation of 
reasonableness standards whether he is consciously aware of that 
fact or not.”26  
Strict liability torts, however, provide liability without fault 
(typically involving forseeability of harm and blameworthy conduct) 
for abnormally dangerous activities and defective products among 
other categories.  Theorists ascribe various policy reasons for 
imposing strict liability—from better deterrence to more generous 
compensation; from wide risk spreading to basic fairness.27  
Given the aforementioned background principles, what would be 
the nature of the potential fault-based and strict liability-based 
wrongs suffered by a victim of annoyancetech electronic 
vigilantism?  First, on a very general level, the impalpable 
autonomy of an individual to live as he or she deems fit—however 
eccentric or bothersome—is challenged, and possibly violated, by 
someone who seeks to punish or control another for a barking dog, 
poor driving, unwanted television or radio noise, or irritating teens.  
Second, the dignity of a target of annoyancetech vigilantism may be 
sullied.  This dignitary interest is intangible and addresses the 
emotional distress and insult that a victim of electronic vigilantism 
might experience at the loss of freedom and the underhanded 
subjugation to the will of another person.  Third, a victim of 
annoyancetech measures could very possibly experience diminished 
enjoyment or hedonic impairment in using his or her property (pets, 
cell phones, stereos, televisions, and electrical appliances) by 
devices that shut down, silence, or interfere with the property.  
Fourth, after being the victim of electronic vigilantism—and 
discovering the particular facts regarding the nature of the 
annoyancetech device and how it was used by the perpetrator—a 
person might experience anxiety that a similar stealth interference 
with his or her life enjoyment might happen in the future.  Fifth, 
the victim of annoyancetech vigilantism may experience unpleasant 
stress at having his or her privacy breached by another who 
electronically tampers with one’s seclusion.  Sixth, casualties of 
electronic annoyancetech, when discovering that another has taken 
self-help measures because of perceived antisocial behavior (loud 
music, public cell phone usage, barking dogs) may experience 
reputational distress if the incident is reported or publicized.  
 
26 Id. at 2–3. 
27 Id. at 964–68. 
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Seventh, targets of annoyancetech vigilantism may, of course, incur 
tangible economic loss: of the health or death of a pet who has been 
silenced by electronic pulses; of the health or death of a teenager 
who has been accosted by electronic sounds; of the proper 
functioning of cell phones, televisions, stereos and other electronic 
appliances that have been electronically tampered with; of lost 
business opportunities that come about because a PowerPoint sales 
pitch at a convention was shut down or an important commercial 
call was dropped.  
Users of annoyancetech devices would, in most cases, be at fault 
for intent-based conduct.  They would have the purpose of silencing 
a dog, dispersing teenagers, shutting down electronic devices, and 
the like; doubtful cases would still seem easy marks for the 
substantial certainty prong of intent.28  In instances where non-
target annoyances are impacted by annoyancetech devices 
(collateral damage so to speak), transferred-intent would likely lead 
to liability of intentional torts (with the exception of the tort of 
outrage which does not transfer).29  Potential tort causes of action 
would include assault,30 battery,31 trespass to chattels,32 
conversion,33 and even intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(outrage).34  An action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion 
upon seclusion or private affairs is possible if annoyancetech tactics 
by a tort defendant involve making video or sound recordings of a 
person from a private space.35  Since the scope and sweep of an 
electronic annoyancetech device could forseeably harm non-targets 
 
28 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (“The defendant has an intent to achieve 
a specified result when the defendant either (1) has a purpose to accomplish that result or (2) 
lacks such a purpose but knows to a substantial certainty that the defendant’s action will 
bring about the result.”).  1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 48 (footnote omitted).  
29 The doctrine of transferred intent “holds that if the defendant intended to cause any one 
of five trespassory torts,” descended from the old English writ of trespass (assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land), “then the defendant ‘intended’ 
to cause any invasion within that range of actions that befalls either the intended victim or a 
third party.”  VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 19 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter JOHNSON, 
MASTERING].  But see Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 903, 908–10 (2004) (arguing that courts should be cautious about applying the 
doctrine of transferred intent to third-parties not known by the defendant to be present). 
30 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21, 32 (1965). 
31 § 13.  
32 §§ 217–18. 
33 § 222A. 
34 § 46. 
35 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).  According to § 652B, an action for 
intrusion upon seclusion will lie if the defendant commits an intentional intrusion (physical 
or otherwise) upon solitude, seclusion or private affairs that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.  
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in closely packed urban and suburban neighborhoods, the tort of 
negligence would also exist as a theory of liability for non-target 
plaintiffs and target plaintiffs to deploy against annoyancetech 
electronic vigilantes.  Moreover, electronic vigilante users of 
annoyancetech devices could conceivably be held liable for 
abnormally-dangerous strict liability.  In this regard, judges, who 
undertake question of law calculations of whether or not particular 
uses of annoyancetech devices are “abnormally dangerous” under 
section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,36 might readily 
conclude that activities like electronically silencing a neighbor’s dog, 
dispersing a group of teenagers, shutting down a television, cutting 
off a cell phone conversation, or scolding a motorist triggers a 
preponderance of the six factors.  Strict liability for using 
annoyancetech could plausibly be based on the following section 520 
factors:  
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the 
person, land or chattels of others;  
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of 
reasonable care;  
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common 
usage;   
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is 
carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed 
by its dangerous attributes.37   
Manufacturers, sellers, and marketers of annoyancetech devices 
would face potential liability for purveying defective products based 
on strict liability for failure to warn the user of untoward 
consequences of the devices to third parties and their property.  
Moreover, annoyancetech devices might be prime candidates for 
product-category strict liability because the dangers of having the 
product on the market outweigh its utility.38  On the other hand, to 
the extent that electronic vigilantism is viewed by a court as being 
justified in a particular case, annoyancetech purveyors could assert 
that the devices, like guns, do what they were designed to do and 
 
36 § 520. 
37 § 520(a)–(f). 
38 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 301 (N.J. 1983) (holding, in a strict 
product liability tort suit for injuries suffered when plaintiff dove into an above-ground 
swimming pool, that the jury could conclude that the product was so dangerous and of so little 
utility that it should not have been marketed at all). 
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should not subject purveyors of the devices to strict tort product 
liability.39 
III.  ANNOYANCETECH TORT DEFENSES 
A.  Intentional Torts and Negligence Defenses 
The justificatory success of tort defendants who intentionally or 
negligently cause personal, property, or emotional harm to others by 
using electronic annoyancetech devices will depend on a hodgepodge 
of what can usefully be called self-help legal doctrines and 
principles.  These self-help legal constructs, in turn, can be divided 
into three parts: (1) traditional intentional tort defenses, (2) 
traditional negligence tort defenses and barriers, and (3) analogical 
self-help defenses. 
1.  Traditional Intentional Tort Defenses 
Tort suits based on purposeful use of annoyancetech electronic 
devices have eight traditional tort defenses that are theoretically 
applicable: (1) self-defense, (2) defense of others, (3) private 
necessity, (4) public necessity, (5) defense of property, (6) unlawful 
conduct, (7) consent, and (8) general justification. 
First, considering the privilege of self-defense, annoyancetech 
vigilantes would probably flounder in their attempt to use this 
defense because the typical use of annoyancetech devices is 
retaliatory in nature, stemming from frustration at the relatively 
trifling conduct of others.40  Furthermore, the privilege of self-
defense requires reasonable force under the circumstances; conduct 
by others like verbal threats, however, is legally insufficient to 
trigger the self-defense privilege.41  Accordingly, if verbal threats 
are not an appropriate predicate for lawful exercise of the privilege, 
unthreatening and merely annoying behavior that has no tendency 
to suggest imminent bodily harm would likely be insufficient to 
justify electronic reaction. 
Second, defense of others, for reasons similar to our consideration 
of the privilege of self-defense, is a weak defense for annoyancetech 
users who cause harm to others.  In most cases, the vigilante 
annoyancetech user would be using the technology not because she 
 
39 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.  
40 Retaliation destroys the self-defense privilege.  1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 160. 
41 Id. 
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reasonably believed that force was necessary to protect another 
from physical harm, but because the annoyancetech user wants to 
punish another for what the user perceives as antisocial conduct.42   
Third, a privilege of private necessity may exist if it is apparently 
necessary for one to invade the interests of the plaintiff in order to 
prevent greater harm.43  In all but the most extreme situations (a 
neighbor’s continuously barking dog that prevents sleep and is not 
stopped by police intervention, or a blaring television set in a 
physician’s waiting room that is out of reach and will not be tuned 
down by office staff), engaging in self-help annoyancetech measures 
would not be protected by the privilege of private necessity.44   
Fourth, the privilege of public necessity, for reasons similar to my 
private necessity analysis, would be of no avail to an annoyancetech 
vigilante in all but the most extreme of situations.45 
Fifth, while a possessor of property may use reasonable force to 
defend property,46 it would be difficult to fathom legitimate 
annoyancetech defenses based on this privilege. 
Sixth, some states provide for a privilege of unlawful conduct to 
bar recovery for an intentional tort.47  At first blush, this defense 
might be attractive to a user of annoyancetech devices who is sued 
in tort by plaintiffs who own barking dogs, who are bad drivers of 
automobiles, and who are other technical law breakers.  On closer 
examination, however, the defense would likely not prove effective 
for the annoyancetech user because it requires that (a) the conduct 
constitutes a serious violation of the law and (b) the injuries for 
which recovery is sought were a direct result of that violation.48  
Irksome driving (including tailgating, changing lanes without 
signals, driving below the speed limit), for example, would not be 
considered a serious violation of the law (whereas speeding at a 
high rate of speed or drunken driving might); harboring one barking 
dog, by way of further example, would likely be viewed as a minor 
violation of a disturbing the peace ordinance (but keeping multiple 
continuously barking dogs might be deemed a serious legal 
 
42 Id. (noting that retaliation is not permitted in defense of others). 
43 The privilege of private necessity, however, “can only be invoked when the defendant is 
threatened, or reasonably appears to be threatened with serious harm and the response is 
reasonable in the light of the threat.”  Id. at 249 (footnote omitted). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 170. 
47 JOHNSON, MASTERING, supra note 29, at 61. 
48 Id. 
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violation).49   
Seventh, a privilege of consent50 could conceivably apply to 
certain annoyancetech tort actions if notice of the device was 
provided.  Thus, by way of analogy to a property owner who posts a 
warning sign, such as “Beware of Dog” (or lines his perimeter fence 
with barbed wire), we might imagine a property owner posting a 
warning sign that a “Kids Be Gone” device for irritating 
neighborhood congregations of teenagers or an ultrasonic squeal 
device for barking dogs was on the premises.  Under the principle of 
volenti non fit injuria, whereby one who deliberately confronts a 
known danger thereby manifests consent, neighborhood dog owners 
and neighborhood teenagers (and their parents) might be precluded 
from recovering for intentional torts against the annoyancetech 
vigilante.   
Finally, under a general justification defense, whereby the law of 
torts recognizes privileges under new and changing circumstances, 
we might see a lawyer in a future annoyancetech intentional tort 
suit make the following illustrative creative argument—“my client 
alerted the police on numerous occasions about the loud barking 
dogs of the plaintiff who sues for trespass to chattels.  No fines were 
assessed.  The local government did not take the matter seriously.”  
The lawyer might close by contending: “My client used the 
ultrasonic squeal device as a last resort to obtain some peace and 
quiet at an affordable price.”51  
 
49 See, e.g., Mary Owen & Sheila Burt, Barking to be Ticketed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2008, at 
35 (describing the frequent “loud barking” of an Illinois homeowner’s neighbor’s three 
German Shepherds, leading the village of Homer Glen to pass an ordinance whereby “owners 
of animals that make loud noises for longer than 15 minutes” are fined after a second 
complaint up to $100, and after a third complaint up to $750).  Query: would a fourth 
violation of the Homer Glen ordinance be considered a “serious” violation of law sufficient to 
provide a tort defense for a neighbor using an electronic dog device? 
50 Apparent consent or actual consent might conceivably apply.  JOHNSON, MASTERING, 
supra note 29, at 48. 
51 The problem with this general justification ploy—which conceptually requires a showing 
that the defendant’s conduct was acceptable under the circumstances—is that an 
annoyancetech defendant would not be seeking to apprehend a so-called antisocial wrongdoer.  
Instead, the defendant’s conduct would likely be viewed as retribution not reasonably 
calculated to protect the defendant’s person or property when other feasible alternative 
courses of action—such as calling the police, asking the plaintiff to moderate antisocial 
behavior, or suing in nuisance—would be available.  Cf. Sindle v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 307 
N.E.2d 245, 247–48 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
permitting the defendants to amend their answers to present evidence of justification where 
one of the defendants, a school bus driver, drove unruly children to the police station when 
some of the children continued to engage in acts of vandalism to the bus despite requests by 
the defendant for the children to stop the serious misbehavior).  
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2.  Traditional Negligence Tort Defenses 
In riposting against tort of negligence suits by tort plaintiffs who 
claim personal or property damages caused by annoyancetech 
devices, several potential considerations may come into play to limit 
or abrogate liability. 
First, issues of factual causation may call into question whether 
or not the particular annoyancetech device was a substantial cause 
of claimed damages.52  Second, while intervening criminal or 
intentionally tortious conduct sometimes cuts off negligence liability 
of a tortfeasor, manufacturers of annoyancetech devices would 
likely be unprotected under such a theory because the very nature 
of the devices are designed to be used by vigilantes who want to 
punish annoying behavior of others.53  Third, since damages are an 
essential element of the tort of negligence,54 plaintiffs may have 
difficulty proving recoverable damages for relatively minor 
interferences with their property occasioned by an annoyancetech 
device.  It is possible, however, that juries may award non-economic 
damages for pain and suffering if they determine that a particular 
annoyancetech device caused plaintiff to incur distress.55  Yet “most 
courts hold that negligent harm to property, by itself, is an 
insufficient predicate for an award of emotional-distress damages at 
least if the harm occurs outside of the plaintiff’s presence and is the 
result of mere negligence.”56  If, however, the gravamen of a 
plaintiff’s negligence case is really negligent infliction of emotional 
distress caused by an annoyancetech device, the plaintiff will 
usually have to prove severe emotional distress, which is ordinarily 
judged by an objective standard.57  
Fourth—regarding defenses based on an annoyancetech plaintiff’s 
conduct in negligence cases—in jurisdictions that have adopted 
comparative negligence or comparative fault, the nature of a 
plaintiff’s antisocial act that triggered the defendant’s use or 
marketing of an annoyancetech device would be relevant to reduce 
 
52 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 405.  
53 Id. at 462. 
54 Id. at 269. 
55 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1050–51 (2001). 
56 JOHNSON, MASTERING, supra note 29, at 180. 
57 See, e.g., Lewis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 487 N.E.2d 1071, 1071–73 (Ill. 1985) 
(holding that an ordinary person would not have suffered severe distress from being trapped 
in an elevator for forty minutes; therefore, plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress was dismissed).  But see Johnson v. Supersave Mkts., Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 
213 (Mont. 1984) (finding that substantial indicia of emotional distress genuineness exists if 
there has been a “substantial invasion of a legally protected interest”). 
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(or bar) damages.58  Assumption of risk defenses would likely be 
unavailable by a defendant sued by an annoyancetech victim—
express assumption of risk would not exist;59 primary implied 
assumption of risk would falter in most case scenarios because of 
the lack of a sport or game;60 secondary implied assumption of risk 
would be inapplicable because of the lack of voluntariness in 
annoyancetech victims in confronting a risk of harm from vigilante 
use of electronic devices and the absence of manifested willingness 
to relieve the user or marketer of these devices from obligations to 
exercise reasonable care.61 
3.  Analogical Self-Help Defenses 
Some kinds of self-help are permitted by the law whereby a party 
is allowed to remedy a wrong by another without calling upon the 
police or initiating legal proceedings.62  Examples in the realm of 
commercial law include the right to repossess an automobile63 and 
the right of a bank to setoff an account balance of a customer who 
owes money to the bank.64  An important limitation of these 
commercial self-help measures, however, is a prohibition against 
 
58 JOHNSON, MASTERING supra note 29, at 230–31. 
59 Express assumption of risk requires an agreement in advance between potential tort 
parties whereby the plaintiff agrees with the defendant, prior to the harm, not to hold the 
defendant liable for failure to exercise reasonable care.  See, e.g., Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 
A.2d 821, 828 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (upholding an express release for negligence); Gross 
v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing the requirements of a valid pre-accident 
release).  
60 The primary assumption of risk doctrine holds that a defendant is under no tort duty to 
protect a plaintiff from inherent risks in a particular sport or recreational activity.  See, e.g., 
Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470, 472–73 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying the 
doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk to preclude a plaintiff’s claim for negligence 
against a hotel for injuries received in a game of climbing a sliding board backwards); 
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967–69 (N.Y. 1986) (applying the doctrine of primary 
implied assumption of risk to bar a horse-racing jockey’s claims for negligence against the 
racetrack and another jockey).  
61 See, e.g., Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 266 (Tex. 1974) (holding no secondary 
implied assumption of risk by a plaintiff who was injured by defendant’s boar hog, since the 
defendant was not entitled to force the plaintiff to surrender his rights to use his real 
property by staying indoors to avoid the dangerous animal and because plaintiff’s 
confrontation of the danger of being attacked by defendant’s hog was involuntary). 
62 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 166–67. 
63 Id. at 139, 189–90. 
64 The United States Supreme Court has recognized a bank’s right of setoff multiple times.  
See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of 
setoff . . . allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each 
other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” (quoting Studley 
v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913))).  Also, for a brief discussion and example of 
a bank’s right to setoff against a depositor see Bank’s Right of Set-Off, 60 BANKING L.J. 4, 4–8 
(1943).   
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breaching the peace by causing a confrontation that could 
conceivably lead to violence.65  A tort defendant who has used or 
marketed annoyancetech devices would likely be viewed by courts 
as breaching the peace by engaging in or enabling retributional 
behavior against another likely to spur violence, if discovered by the 
victim. 
Some privileges to intentional tort actions are other candidates, 
by analogy, for annoyancetech tort users or marketers.  One is the 
privilege to discipline.  The argument by an annoyancetech tort 
defendant would be that he used the electronic device to “discipline” 
the plaintiff for antisocial activity (like harboring continuously 
barking dogs, noisy parties late at night, or playing an obnoxious 
television show or radio program in a public place).  This argument, 
however, would likely fail because the privilege of discipline has 
been strictly limited by courts and legislators to apply only to 
military discipline of military members66 and reasonable parental 
discipline of minor children by those who are properly in charge of a 
child’s care.67  
 
65 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-609 (2008) (formerly U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977)); Eugene Mikolajczyk, 
Comment, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code—A Modern 
Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REV. 351, 355 (1977).   
 In implementing the self-help policies of protecting the debtor’s personal interests and 
society’s prohibition against the use of force, courts have held that it is a breach of the 
peace to effect repossession by the use of force directed against the debtor.  Many courts 
in cases of self-help repossession derived precedent from the criminal law definitions of 
breach of peace.   
 The criminal law definitions of breach of peace is essentially oriented to the use or 
threatened use of violence.  Courts in self-help cases derive precedent from this 
definition when violence occurs during the repossession.  Unfortunately, however, at 
least one court that applied the criminal law definition has determined that violence is a 
“necessary” element to a finding of breach of peace. . . .    
 When the secured party’s method of repossession entails less than blatant violence, 
the criminal law definition of breach of peace as a violence-oriented concept may no 
longer be effective in protecting the debtor’s personal interest.  Increasingly, the breach 
of peace definition is analyzed from the tort perspective of harmful or offensive touching. 
Id. at 355–56. 
66 The Uniform Code of Military Justice governs the disciplinary rules of the Armed Forces 
of the United States and provides for courts martial procedures and other military 
punishments for various misbehaviors by military personnel.  Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–1800 (2006); see also DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3–7 (7th ed. 2008).  
67 Parents may apply the force or impose the confinement that they reasonably believe is 
necessary for controlling or training their children.  1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 
(1965).  Factors bearing on the reasonableness of parental discipline of children include: the 
age of the child, the nature of the child’s misbehavior, the example to be set for other children 
in the family, whether the parental punishment is necessary and appropriate to induce 
obedience, and whether the behavior is disproportionate, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to 
cause serious or permanent harm.  § 150.  The parental privilege to discipline children may be 
extended to persons who are properly in charge of the children but who are not the actual 
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Another potential analogical intentional tort privilege that might 
be of interest to annoyancetech tort defendants is the privilege of 
citizen arrest.  The argument by an annoyancetech defendant would 
be that she used the electronic device on the plaintiff or the 
plaintiff’s property to affect the functional equivalent of a citizen’s 
arrest for the plaintiff’s antisocial conduct.  This argument, 
however, would likely fail because of the severe limitations most 
jurisdictions place on a citizen’s arrest, the likelihood that most 
antisocial behavior would not be felonious, and the likely failure of a 
defendant to show that use of an annoyancetech device was an 
“arrest” as opposed to a vengeful act.68  
B.  Strict Liability Tort Defenses 
Annoyancetech users and marketers defending against a strict 
liability tort for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities 
would be hard-pressed to present evidence of any of the equitable 
factors under Restatement principles.  Those users and marketers 
could argue that the likelihood of harm that results from most 
annoyancetech devices would be low, and—although a stretch—that 
the value to the community of punishing or abating antisocial 
behavior, like barking dogs, loud teenagers, or obnoxious 
televisions, outweighs the dangerous attributes of the vigilante 
electronic devices.69  Under the reformulated abnormally-dangerous 
provisions of the Third Restatement, however, annoyancetech 
defendants could focus their argument on the lack of “physical 
harm” provided as a more restrictive ambit of strict liability; most 
annoyancetech scenarios would likely not involve physical harm to 
 
parents of the children.  § 147(2).  Examples might include schools and teachers, child-care 
providers, surrogate parents, and school bus drivers.  
68 An arrest takes a person into custody for the purpose of bringing a person before a court 
or police entity administering the law.  1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 127 (1965).  The 
privilege of a citizen’s arrest permits a private defendant to arrest a plaintiff in three 
potential situations.  First, the plaintiff has in fact committed the felony (serious crime) for 
which he is arrested; second, someone has committed a felony and the defendant reasonably 
suspects that the plaintiff is the person responsible; or third, the plaintiff has committed a 
breach of the peace in the presence of the defendant.  § 119.  
 Another analogical defense by a user of annoyancetech devices to a tort suit might be self-
help to remedy a nuisance.  See Jon K. Wactor, Note, Self-Help: A Viable Remedy for 
Nuisance? A Guide for the Common Man’s Lawyer, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 98 (1982) (“[While 
s]elf-help abatement of nuisance is an established principle of common law,” problems would 
likely exist for an annoyancetech tort defendant because “breach of peace or unnecessary 
damage cannot occur during the abatement attempt.”  The annoyance uses examined in this 
article would likely run afoul of these key limitations). 
69 See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
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the plaintiff but, rather, harm to the plaintiff’s property 
accompanied by purely non-physical emotional distress.70   
Annoyancetech manufacturers and marketers defending against a 
strict liability tort for product defects by a victim, who has suffered 
damages because of someone’s use of an electronic device, would 
likely face design defect claims based on an argument by plaintiffs 
that the annoyancetech device flunks a risk/utility calculus or 
failure-to-warn defect claims.71  The only feasible defense for 
annoyancetech defendants is to argue that their products are 
“unavoidably unsafe,” along the lines that knives, guns, alcohol, and 
tobacco are dangerous by nature.72  Annoyancetech manufacturers 
and marketers, however, are likely to be met with arguments by 
plaintiffs that annoyancetech devices are manifestly too risky in the 
light of the low—if not nonexistent—utility of the products.73  A 
defense based on a defect warning for annoyancetech devices would 
be logically flawed.  Although “[w]hen a product is unavoidably 
dangerous,” as virtually all annoyancetech devices would be, “a 
warning permits the consumer to make informed choices whether to 
accept the product,”74  it is the plaintiff victim in an annoyancetech 
product strict liability action who would, by definition, be unable to 
read warnings or make a choice. 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  The Historical Problematics and Uses of Vigilante Justice 
While Americans have become accustomed to public policing of 
antisocial conduct since the mid-nineteenth century,75 “[t]he 
 
70 The reformation of strict liability in the context of abnormally dangerous activities is as 
follows: 
(a) A defendant who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict 
liability for physical harm resulting from the activity. 
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if: 
(1) The activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm 
even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and 
(2) The activity is not a matter of common usage. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) 
(emphasis added).  
71 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).  
72 2 DOBBS, supra note 55, at 988–89; see also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
cmt. k (1965).   
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. e (1998). 
74 2 DOBBS, supra note 55, at 1005. 
75 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY 603 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2001).  “In 
colonial America, policing relied on community consensus and citizens’ service as constables 
and in sheriffs’ posses.  Public punishments were the most important means of encouraging 
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American police tradition also includes private policing” and 
vigilante justice movements.76  Lawrence Friedman discusses the 
vigilante movement in the American West in conjunction with ad 
hoc, privately-instituted “miners’ codes,” in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, as “[t]wo famous western institutions” of 
privately-ordered frontier justice.77   
The miners’ codes were little bodies of law adopted as 
binding customs in western mining camps.  The miners’ 
courts and codes resembled . . . the claim clubs of the 
Midwest.  These were [private] organizations of squatters 
who banded together to control the outcomes of public land 
auctions.  The claim clubs also drew up rules and procedures, 
to govern, record, and document the land claims of their 
members.  Such clubs flourished in Wisconsin in the late 
1830s, in Iowa through the 1840s.  There is some slight 
evidence of connection between the claim clubs, miners’ 
groups in the Midwest (near Galena, Illinois, and in 
southwestern Wisconsin), and the miners’ codes of the Far 
West.78 
 
conformity and order.  Modern American police forces, patrols to prevent and detect crime 
and maintain order, arose in the nineteenth century” as adaptations of English institutions.  
Id.  New York City’s police force, formed in 1845, is viewed as the first modern police force in 
America, “modeled on London’s Metropolitan Police,” which was organized in 1829.  Id.  
Notably, New York City’s  
policemen walked beats, and they had power to arrest without a warrant.  They also 
performed services such as rescuing lost children or animals or lodging the homeless 
temporarily in station houses.  Other [American] cities, and later small towns, followed 
this model. . . . 
. . . .  
 By the early twentieth century, reformers emphasized professionalization, a more 
military-style organization, higher educational standards, better training, concentration 
on crime-fighting over general service, and freedom from politics.  However, 
professionalization sometimes widened the distance between the police and local 
communities. 
Id.  Advanced technology innovation was important to American police forces.  “Mobility 
evolved from walking the beat to horse-drawn patrol wagons . . . to motorcycles, automobiles, 
and helicopters.  Communications progressed from rapping a club on the street to radios and 
computers.”  Id.  Moreover, “[i]nvestigative methods progressed from mug shots to up-to-date 
crime labs . . . computerization, and DNA analysis.”  Id.  
76 Id.  “Vigilante movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the 
vigilantes of early San Francisco or the Ku Klux Klan, expressed fear of outsiders or minority 
groups.”  Id.  Moreover, “[f]ormal private police forces, like the Pennsylvania Coal and Iron 
Police and the strikebreaking Pinkerton Detective Agency, founded in 1852 by Allan 
Pinkerton, served industrialists’ interests in labor disputes.”  Id.; see also EDWARD L. AYERS, 
VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 
151–62 (1984) (discussing vigilante justice).  
77 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 275 (3d ed. 2005).  
78 Id. at 275.  According to Friedman: 
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Friedman’s account of the details of the American “vigilante 
movement” of the late-nineteenth century notes that it “was more 
flamboyant, and at times more sinister”79 than the private miners’ 
codes of the same period.  As Friedman notes:  
This was not exclusively a western phenomenon; but the 
West was the vigilante heartland.  The two San Francisco 
Vigilance Committees, of 1851 and 1856, were early and 
famous examples.  These committees were “businessmen’s 
revolutions” directed against corrupt, inept local 
government.  Those who supported the vigilantes considered 
themselves decent citizens, using self-help, taking the law 
into their own hands, striking out against violence, 
corruption, and misrule in San Francisco.  The city was 
turbulent, anarchic; gold-hungry hordes had swollen its 
population.  The first committee began its work by arresting 
a “desperate character” named Jenkins.  He was given a kind 
of trial, convicted and hanged from a heavy wooden 
beam . . . . Other bad characters were simply told to get out of 
town.80 
Vigilante justice also existed in other western communities in the 
late-nineteenth century including: Carson City, Nevada; Denver, 
Colorado; Cheyenne and Laramie, Wyoming; Montana; and Idaho.81  
While the “vigilante story” in the American West was at times 
harsh, Friedman properly points out that there were logical reasons 
for vigilante groups.82  “The vigilantes were often not really reacting 
to a legal vacuum; they were fighting against a legal order that was 
simply not to their liking.  Not just weak justice, but justice that (in 
the eyes of elites) was reaching the wrong results.”83  Indeed, 
 
These miners’ codes were at least as old as the California gold rush, and were also found 
in other parts of the West. . . . Many codes were reduced to written form.  They set up 
rough but workable rules and processes for recording claims, for deciding whose claim 
was first, for settling disputes among claimants, and for enforcing decisions of miners’ 
“courts.”  The Gregory Diggings ruled itself through its little legal system two years 
before Colorado Territory was formally organized.  The mining code served the function, 
well known in American legal history, of a makeshift judicial and political order, in 
places that were settled before ordinary government institutions arrived.  Other mining 
districts copied the Gregory code. . . . The Colorado territorial legislature in 1861 and 
1862 ratified, with a broad sweep, the local claims and judgments these informal courts 
had rendered. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 275–76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
81 Id. at 276–77.  
82 Id. at 277.  
83 Id. 
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another legal scholar confirmed this view, noting that American 
late-nineteenth-century “vigilantism was not really a ‘pre-law 
phenomenon,’ a ‘groping towards the creation of legal institutions,’ 
but more accurately a ‘reaction against the corruption, weakness, or 
delays’ of the established legal order.”84  
“In any event, social control, like nature, abhors a vacuum.  The 
‘respectable’ citizens—the majority, perhaps?—in western towns 
were not really lawless.”85  To the contrary, “[t]hey were Americans; 
they were unwilling to tolerate too sharp a break in social 
continuity; they reacted against formal law that was too slow, or too 
corrupt, for their purposes . . . . [They] were products of a culture 
clash, in small communities” of an emerging nature.86  
B.  Twenty-First-Century Extreme American Neighborhood Trends 
In a recent article, I uncover a troublesome trend of inept, slow, 
and potentially corrupt police, and formal legal control of 
neighborhood disputes.87  My research uncovered instances where 
land use or boundary disputes dragged on for years,88 cases of police 
response to neighborhood arguments that culminated in police 
violence and abuse,89 and instances of recurring retaliation and 
taunting by out-of-control neighbors angered at a neighbor’s 
behavior.90   
Are we seeing a level of frustration by twenty-first-century 
Americans that matches the historical pattern of American 
frustration with the formal governments and laws of the late-
nineteenth century that culminated in vigilante justice?91  Could the 
demand for, and development and recent popularity of, revenge-
motivated annoyancetech electronic devices be a logical 
manifestation of American frustration with the ability or 
willingness of public police forces and formal legal processes to 
adequately manage antisocial neighborhood misbehavior involving 
loud animals, unruly children, wild parties, and the like? 
 
84 Id. at 276–77 (quoting Willard Hurst, The Uses of Law in Four ‘Colonial’ States of the 
American Union, 1945 WIS. L. REV. 577, 585 (1945)).   
85 Id. at 277.  
86 Id. 
87 Robert F. Blomquist, Extreme American Neighborhood Law, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.  
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C.  Some Sociological Perspectives 
Pending more robust case histories regarding the demand for 
production and use of annoyancetech electronic devices to respond 
to perceived antisocial behaviors in neighborhoods and public places 
(which case studies would enable comparative and longitudinal 
analyses), a few sociological musings are in order. 
Under the so-called frustration-aggression theory, human 
“aggressive behavior results when purposeful activity is 
interrupted.”92  A related theory of aggression focuses on social 
learning to behave in accordance with norms of violence because 
individuals come to view aggression as giving rise to positive utility 
or gain through approval by others, prestige, or economic reward.93  
Demand for annoyancetech electronic vigilante devices might fit 
both types of aggression theory: first, Americans might be 
frustrated in having their peace and quiet significantly interrupted, 
and, second, electronic-savvy devotees (accustomed to computers, 
portable communication devices, and other modern contraptions) 
might have learned that electronic technologies can quickly and 
efficiently meet their needs.94 
Demand for and use of annoyancetech electronic devices also 
implicates social norm theory, particularly dynamic models of social 
interaction (with a focus on negotiation of roles and social 
meanings), ethnomethodology, and post-modern philosophy.95  The 
writing of Erving Goffman may be helpful in understanding why 
people might be attracted to a non-dramaturgical, non-interactive 
approach to resolving social conflict by anonymously deploying 
technology to “solve” perceived antisocial behavior of others instead 
of publicly complaining and frontally negotiating a resolution to a 
social problem.96  Perhaps the desire for anonymously deployed 
 
92  A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 12 (Gordon Marshall ed., 2009) [hereinafter SOCIOLOGY]. 
93 Id. at 11–12.  
94 A related sociological topic of interest is “new technology” defined as “[a]ny set of 
productive techniques which offers a significant improvement (whether measured in terms of 
increased output or savings in costs) over the established technology for a given process in a 
specific historical context.”  Id. at 513.  
95 See FRANCESCA CANCIAN, WHAT ARE NORMS? A STUDY OF BELIEFS AND ACTION IN A 
MAYA COMMUNITY 106–09 (1975) (discussing both Parsonsian static conformist norm 
conceptions and dynamic social identity theories of norms that emphasize personal identity so 
that persons conform to norms to demonstrate to themselves and to others that they are a 
particular kind of person).  
96 Goffman was an influential micro-sociologist during the 1960s and 1970s that pioneered 
the so-called dramaturgical perspective of sociology.  Deploying a metaphor of the theater, he 
was interested in the way that people “play” roles and manage the social impressions that 
they present to others in different social settings, and how people interact when they are in 
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annoyancetech devices can be understood as aberrant social 
behavior—deviating from what is considered normal—that is 
performed in secret and for reasons of self-interest, in contrast with 
non-conforming behavior which refers to public violation of social 
norms frequently done to promote social change (such as a political 
or religious dissenter who relishes a proclamation of deviance to an 
audience).97  
Concepts of alienation—“the estrangement of individuals from 
one another, or from a specific situation or process”98—are also 
germane to our better understanding of the growing popularity of 
annoyancetech devices.  Psychological alienation—by those who feel 
powerless and isolated from public sources of power and social 
control like the police and the courts—might account for the 
demand for these electronic vigilante devices.99 
Related to concepts of alienation are sociological constructs of 
anomie and anarchism.  Anomie involves norm turbulence through 
conflict, breakdown, or insufficient social norms.100  Anarchism—
beliefs that society functions better in the absence of government or 
social authority, leading not to chaos but to spontaneous order—has 
been influential in modern debate on topics that include communes, 
decentralization, and federalism, trade union labor movements, and 
Gandhi-inspired techniques of non-violent protest.101  Anomie 
theory could explain how annoyancetech trends might be part of a 
twenty-first-century breakdown in social norms of negotiated 
conflict resolution through personal interaction, mediated by the 
police and the courts.  Moreover, annoyancetech users and 
marketers could be conceived of as participants in a web-inspired 
electronic anarchy. 
Annoyancetech can also be viewed as part of the “broken 
windows” thesis of neighborhood social control that posits a 
 
the presence of others.  See ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE 
PUBLIC ORDER 1–5 (1971) (offering a plethora of new sociological concepts that help the 
understanding of the minute details of face-to-face social interactions); ERVING GOFFMAN, 
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 10–13 (1958) (outlining of his dramaturgical 
framework).   
97 See CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 28–31 (Robert K. Merton & Robert Nisbet eds., 
4th ed., 1971) (discussing different forms of social deviance).   
98 SOCIOLOGY, supra note 92, at 14.  
99 See JOHN TORRANCE, ESTRANGEMENT, ALIENATION AND EXPLOITATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
APPROACH TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1977) (discussing the philosophical, sociological, and 
psychological facets of alienation).  
100 See ANOMIE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE 1–20 (Marshall B. 
Clinard ed., 1964); MARCO ORRU, ANOMIE: HISTORY AND MEANINGS 118–20 (1987).   
101 SOCIOLOGY, supra note 92, at 20–21.  
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connection between public order and crime prevention.102  Under 
this thesis, the most promising way to fight crime is to stop the 
disorder that precedes it.  Thus, a broken window in a building 
might suggest to a pedestrian that no one cares about neighborhood 
order which can theoretically mushroom from petty offenses like 
rock-throwing to the breaking of more windows to serious crimes 
like drug-dealing, robbery, and murder.  “Zero tolerance,” 
neighborhood watch programs and community policing are the 
usual iterations of the broken windows thesis of social control.  But 
it is potentially edifying to think of annoyancetech electronic 
vigilantism against antisocial behavior as a more recent iteration. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The twenty-first century has ushered in demand by some 
Americans for novel electronic gadgetry—called annoyancetech 
devices—that secretly fend off, punish, or comment upon perceived 
antisocial and annoying behaviors of their fellow citizens.  The 
manufacturers, marketers, and users of certain annoyancetech 
devices, however, face possible tort liability under theories of 
intentional, negligence, and strict liability torts for personal and 
property damages suffered by the targets of this “revenge by 
gadget.”  While assorted potential defenses to tort liability for harm 
from annoyancetech devices theoretically exist (traditional 
international tort defenses, traditional negligence tort defenses, and 
strict liability tort defenses), these tort defenses are weak and 
problematic. 
Federal, state, and local policymakers should start the process of 
coming to pragmatic terms with the troubling rise in the popularity 
of annoyancetech electronic devices.  This is an area of social policy 
that cries out for thoughtful and creative legislative solutions.  In 
grappling with this matter, American policymakers should consider 
(1) the historical and problematic uses of vigilante justice; (2) 
twenty-first-century extreme American neighborhood trends; and 
(3) various sociological perspectives regarding human aggression, 
norm theory, alienation, anomie, anarchism, and the “broken 
windows thesis” of neighborhood control.  
 
 
102 See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996). 
